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This study analyzes the impact of the tax benefits for inland regions in Portugal. More 
specifically, we evaluate the effect of this policy change on firm entry and on two 
regional socio-demographic characteristics: child birth and divorce rate.  
Previous studies suggest that reducing taxes increases the level of profit opportunities 
and, thus, the entry of new firms. They also find that in periods of economic prosperity, 
life conditions improve and the divorce rate increases, while there is no conclusive 
evidence about the exact relationship between income and child birth.  
To test these predictions, we use a matched employer-employee dataset (QP – “Quadros 
de Pessoal”) to estimate firms entry between the period 1997 and 2007. Regional socio-
demographic data come from Statistics Portugal (INE – “Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística”).   
Contrary to our expectations, we find that the introduction of the policy reduce firm 
entry, as well as the child birth and divorce rate. We obtain similar results using an 
instrumental variable. The negative effect on firm entry persists even when we divide 
our sample into the different stages of the policy introduction. These results are not 
consistent in restricted samples (nearby counties).  
 
JEL Classification: H25, H32, L26, M13, R11, R58 









Esta dissertação analisa o impacto da política dos benefícios fiscais para as regiões do 
interior em Portugal. Mais especificamente, avaliamos o efeito desta mudança de 
política na entrada de novas empresas e em duas características regionais sócio-
demográficas: taxa de natalidade e taxa de divórcio.  
Estudos anteriores sugerem que a redução de impostos aumenta a rendibilidade das 
empresas e, portanto, a entrada de novas empresas. Também sugerem que em períodos 
de prosperidade económica, as condições de vida melhoram e a taxa de divórcio 
aumenta, enquanto que não há evidências conclusivas sobre a relação exata entre o 
rendimento e a natalidade. 
Para testar estas hipóteses, usámos uma base de dados empregador-empregado (QP – 
“Quadros de Pessoal”) para avaliar as empresas estabelecidas entre o período de 1997 e 
2007. Os dados regionais sócio-demográficos foram recolhidos do INE (“Instituto 
Nacional de Estatística”). 
Contrariamente ao esperado, a introdução da política reduz a entrada de novas 
empresas, assim como a taxa de natalidade e de divórcio. Obtemos resultados 
semelhantes usando uma variável instrumental. O efeito negativo na entrada de 
empresas persiste mesmo quando dividimos a nossa amostra nas diferentes fases da 
introdução da política. Estes resultados não são consistentes nas amostras restritas 
(concelhos vizinhos). 
 
Classificação JEL: H25, H32, L26, M13, R11, R58 
Palavras-chave: Entrada de Empresas, Benefícios Fiscais, Actividade Empresarial, 
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Entrepreneurship plays an important role in the economy. It stimulates competition and 
economic growth by fostering innovation, productivity, and job creation (Ardagna and 
Lusardi, 2008; Carree and Thurik, 2010; Fernandes, et al., 2011; Hansson, 2012; Parker, 
2009). To encourage entrepreneurial activity and correct market failures, governments 
around the world have implemented several policies (Parker, 2009), such as subsidies 
and grants to specific start-ups, entry deregulation reforms, and tax cuts. Among those, 
the most common policy used by the governments to promote firm entry is taxation (Da 
Rin, et al., 2011).  
Despite creating complexity in the tax system and rising compliance and administrative 
costs for both tax payers and governments, tax incentives encourage new firms to start 
their activities (Mintz and Andersen, 1992). Governments usually use tax incentives 
instead of expenditure policies.  First, because it is politically more appealing for the 
government to provide a reduction in taxes rather than give a subsidy to a firm, and then 
because  the administrative burden of determining which firm should benefit from the 
policy decreases for tax incentives (Mintz and Andersen, 1992).       
Tax policy can affect entrepreneurial activity in several ways. It influences not only the 
decision to establish a new business, but also the firm organizational structure and 
profitability (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006). Taxes have a strong impact on the 
organizational form of firms. In fact, the choice of the organizational form is frequently 
made to reach tax advantages or to decrease their taxable base (Luna and Murray, 
2010). Besides, tax policy also influences the cost of capital, which affects in the end 
the hiring and investment decisions of the firm (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006).  
Previous studies found that tax policy has an ambiguous effect on entrepreneurial 
activity. A higher tax rate can reduce firm entry by lowering the entrepreneurial returns, 
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but it can also increase firm entry due to the rewards from tax avoidance or evasion 
(Bruce and Mohsin, 2006; Bruce and Deskins, 2012). On the other hand, tax rate 
reductions provide a monetary benefit that might increase or decrease entrepreneurial 
activity (Fossen and Steiner, 2009; Da Rin, et al., 2011; Bacher and Brülhart, 2013).  
Also, tax benefits can be used as an instrument to promote regional growth by attracting 
investment and creating jobs, especially in economically less developed regions 
(Fernandes, et al., 2011). The reduction of local taxes can contribute to attract more 
entrepreneurs and develop those regions (Rathelot and Sillard, 2008).        
In this study, we evaluate the effect of reducing corporate taxes on firm entry in the less 
favored regions by taking into account a Portuguese tax reform. This reform was 
introduced in 1999 by the government, who created tax benefits for the inland region. 
Their main goal was to fight human desertification and promote economic recover. Our 
research questions are: Does reducing corporate taxes affect entrepreneurial activity? 
How does it affect the regional socio-demographic characteristics? 
To answer our research question, we use a matched employer-employee dataset (QP – 
“Quadros de Pessoal”), which includes detailed information about the founders and 
their firms between 1997 and 2007. In addition we collect data from the Statistics 
Portugal (INE – “Instituto Nacional de Estatística”) on child birth rate and divorce rate.  
Our results suggest a negative effect between the policy of tax benefits and firm entry, 
as well as the child birth and divorce rate. We found that the introduction of the policy 
reduced the entry of new firms, the child birth rate and the divorce rate. These results 
are not consistent in restricted samples (nearby counties). When we divide our sample 
into the three stages of the policy introduction, we found that the policy continues to 
reduce the entry of new firms. In the second stage, we found that both child birth rate 
and the divorce rate increased.  
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This study has several policy implications. Previous studies suggest that reducing 
corporate tax increases investment, creates new jobs and contributes to the economic 
growth, especially in less developed regions. In our study, we find a negative effect 
which suggest that reducing taxation is not enough to promote entrepreneurial activity 
in less developed regions.    
The remaining sections of this study are structured as follows. The next section provides 
an overview of the main literature regarding the impact of the corporate taxation on 
entrepreneurial activity and presents the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the policy 
of tax benefits for inland in Portugal . Section 4 describes our data and presents the 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology and the results of 
















2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Tax policy is a very common instrument used by governments to promote economic 
activity. Their main goal is to encourage the creation of new firms in order to stimulate 
innovation, competition, employment and economic growth (Da Rin et al., 2010). For a 
region, stimulating new firms is a way to promote economic growth (Parker, 2005; 
Fritsch, 2008). Taxes allow the government to redistribute income from wealthy to poor 
citizens. Also, taxes can have strong effects on entrepreneurship, since it is a very 
important driver for innovation and economic development (Block, 2016). New firms 
bring new capacities into the market and are, for that reason, an important element of 
the market process (Fritsch, 2008).  
The rate at which new enterprises enter an industry has led to increasing pressure on 
policy makers to improve the conditions for entrepreneurial activity (Kneller and 
McGowan, 2012). Governments usually make use of tax policy instead of structural 
reforms, since it is easier to change tax rates in the budget law (Da Rin et al., 2011). 
Different kind of taxes (personal income and corporate taxes) affect firm entry 
decisions. 
In this section, we will start by evaluating the impact of personal income taxes and then, 
the impact of corporate income taxes on entrepreneurship. Then, we evaluate several 
characteristics of taxes and we conclude this section by analyzing the impact of tax 
policies on regional demographic characteristics.  
 
2.1. Personal Income Taxes 
Personal income taxes apply to the personal income of an individual. Several studies 
have analyzed the effects of taxes on self-employment and suggested that tax policy has 
an ambiguous effect on entrepreneurial activity (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006). On one 
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hand, the literature shows a negative link between tax rates and self-employment 
(Fölster, 2002; Bruce and Mohsin, 2006; Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello, 2013). In fact, 
high tax rates leads to lower levels of self-employment, as taxes reduce the expected 
return that an individual receives by undertaking a risky business and an additional 
effort associated with being self-employed (De Mooij and Nicodeme, 2010; Hansson, 
2012). On the other hand, high taxes might drive individuals into self-employment 
because it provides tax-sheltering opportunities, which include both avoiding and 
evading taxation. For example, the main reason for the increase of self-employed 
individuals is due to the ease of underreporting taxable income, which allows, in an 
illegally way, to pay less taxes (Schuetze and Bruce, 2004; Gentry and Hubbard, 2005). 
Also, income taxes might encourage entrepreneurial activity as self-employed 
individuals earn substantial personal non-pecuniary returns which are untaxed (Hall and 
Sobel, 2006). Furthermore, higher after-tax earnings appeal individuals to become self-
employed (Fossen, 2008). To sum up, the effect of personal income taxes on self-
employed individuals is ambiguous.  
 
2.2. Corporate Taxes 
Corporate income taxes are the taxes paid by firms on their taxable income. Most 
studies found that lower taxation increases the level of profit opportunities, so it is 
expected to increase the entry of new firms (Djankov et al., 2010; Da Rin et al., 2011; 
Barros, 2016). Using data on firm entry in 17 European countries during the period 
between 1997 and 2004, Da Rin et al. (2011) found evidence of a significant negative 
effect of corporate income taxation on entry rates. This effect is concave, suggesting 
that tax reductions affect entry rates only check below a certain threshold tax level. 
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Similarly, Djankov et al. (2010) found that a higher corporate tax burden significantly 
decreases the gains from entrepreneurship and hence, the rate of firm entry.  
Another fact that leads to the entry of new firms is incorporation. This is a legal way of 
creating a corporate entity. In this way, entrepreneurs pay corporate tax on their 
business profits and are able to choose if they pay themselves a salary as a director of 
their firm or dividends to avoid payroll taxes (Parker, 2009). If corporate income tax 
rates increase, the profits decrease for incorporated firms and hence, reducing incentives 
for individuals to become entrepreneurs (Block, 2016). Thus, the level of tax rates 
influences the decision of incorporate or not. Egger et al.’s (2008) model examines the 
decision to incorporate considering the level of tax rates. Higher effective corporate tax 
rate decreases a firm’s probability of incorporating. Also, existing entrepreneurs seem to 
be much less receptive to tax policy changes than those that are initiating a new 
business (Kneller and McGowan, 2012). 
Therefore, we expect to find a negative correlation between corporate income tax rates 
and entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Hypothesis 1: A reduction on corporate taxes increases firm entry. 
 
2.3. Tax Structure 
Some studies have analyzed how the tax structure affects entrepreneurial activity. Not 
only the tax rate influences the probability of an individual moving to entrepreneurship, 
but also its progressivity/structure and the relation between different taxes: personal 
versus corporate income taxes (Hansson, 2012). Usually, corporate taxes are flat, unlike 
the personal income tax which is likely to be progressive with marginal tax rates that 
increase with income (Parker, 2009).  
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The literature presents ambiguous results for the effect of tax progressivity on 
entrepreneurial activity. Tax progressivity can lower entrepreneurship by reducing the 
size of profit opportunity, but it can also lead to an increase for individuals who can take 
advantage of tax evasion (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). Later on, Gentry and Hubbard 
(2005) conclude that both the level of the marginal tax rate and the progressivity of the 
tax have a negative effect in entrepreneurial entry. Entry rates might also be affected by 
the complexity of corporate income tax system and by tax burdens. Bacher and Brülhart 
(2013) evaluated the effect of corporate income tax schedule on firm births, using Swiss 
micro-level data. They examined three effects: effect of the average tax burden, effect 
of progressivity, and effect of the complexity of the system. They found that lower 
average tax rates and less tax code complexity promote firm births, while reduced 
progressivity deters it. 
Associated with these issues, Cullen and Gordon (2007) developed a model that 
examine the importance of the tax structure and found that the impact of taxes on 
entrepreneurial risk-taking depends on the kind of taxes. Their model showed the effect 
of the tax structure on self-employment operated through three channels: first income-
shifting, the tax structure offers incentives to shift income from highly taxed labor 
income to lower taxed corporate income, or vice versa; second risk-subsidy, the tax 
structure encourages risk-taking as it allows incorporation and losses can be deducted 
against highly taxed labor earnings; third risk-sharing. As higher corporate income taxes 
create a risk-sharing effect, this lowers the entrepreneur’s risk-premium and encourages 
entry. According to Cullen and Gordon (2007), raising the income tax has an 
ambiguously positive effect on the probability of individuals to become self-employed, 




2.4. Regional Demographic Characteristics 
One of the most common instruments used by governments to promote the less 
developed regions is the tax benefits. Tax benefits usually contribute to the development 
of regions, especially those with less financial resources (Sequeira and Sá, 2008). It is 
expected that these incentives are capable of strengthen the economic and social 
characteristics of those regions. In this way, they usually promote investment and, thus, 
the creation of employment opportunities, and encourage economic activity, which 
increases public revenues and public services (Sequeira and Sá, 2008; Fernandes, et al., 
2011). This encouragement in the backward regions would lead to localized incentives 
(Klemm, 2010). 
Some studies found a positive relationship between income and child birth (Rupert, 
2008). New entry brings new investment and stimulates employment, creating better life 
conditions for people who live in the less developed regions (Sequeira and Sá, 2008; 
Fernandes, et al., 2011). As such, there is a tendency for people to migrate to those 
regions, in which they may find better life conditions. So, new firm entries promote 
regional social and economic growth (Fernandes, et al., 2011). The migration inflows 
will be associated with an increase on child birth rate. On the other hand, some studies 
found some factors that have a negative impact on child birth (Galor and Weil, 1996; 
Adserà, 2004). According to Galor and Weil (1996), there is a negative relationship 
between income and child birth. They found that higher wages for women will make 
them spend more of their time working. This will then raise the opportunity cost of 
having a child, which will lead to a decrease on child birth rate. Other explanation to 
this negative impact is the labor market instability. Confronted with this instability, 
women postpone or even abandon the idea of having a child, as this would reduce 
lifetime income and increase employment uncertainty (Adserà, 2004). The negative 
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relationship between income and child birth is considered a theoretical puzzle for some 
economists, since it is expected that as the income goes up, the child birth should also 
go up (Rupert, 2008).     
Despite all the empirical work, there is no conclusive evidence about the exact 
relationship between income and child birth. In this way, we will test our hypothesis 
according to our expectations. Thus, we expect to find that with the entry of new firms 
the birth rate increases, since more people will migrate to eligible regions. Also, as the 
life conditions improve, the number of child birth rate would also increase. Thus, we 
expect 
 
Hypothesis 2: A reduction on corporate taxes increases regional child birth. 
 
Some authors find that in periods of prosperity the divorce rate increases (South, 1985; 
Trent and South, 1989). In this periods, the participation of female workers in the labor 
market increases. And this, by consequence, will have a strong negative impact on the 
divorce rate (South, 1985; Trent and South, 1989; Weiss, Tzeng and Mare, 1995; 1997; 
Jalovaara, 2003). According to Jalovaara (2003), the risk of divorce is associated with 
the spouses’ socioeconomic position. Women who were employed and whose her 
husbands also are employed had stable marriages. If the husband have a high income, 
the risk of divorce is low. In contrast, if the wife have also a high income, this increases 
the risk of divorce, especially if it exceeds the husband income. Tzeng and Mare (1995) 
also find that if wives work more than their husbands, this rises the chances of 
disruption. Besides, positive changes in wives’ socioeconomic and labor force 
characteristics increase the probability of divorce.     
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Therefore, as regional economic activity increases due to tax cuts, we expect an increase 
on the divorce rate. Individuals will probably be more focused at work, more tired and 
they will spend less time at home. We expect 
 




















3. Tax Benefits for Inland Regions 
To better frame the paper’s results, we will briefly describe the policy of tax benefits for 
inland regions in Portugal. Appendix A presents the laws and documents associated 
with tax benefits for inland regions. 
This policy started by the Law nr. 127-B/97 which gave legislative authorization for the 
incumbent government at the time (PS) to create a system of fiscal incentives for the 
micro and small firms. Then, it was created the Projeto de Lei 522/VII, which was a 
legislative initiative from PSD1 over the legislative authorization of the previous law. 
After its approval, the government created the Law nr. 171/99 in order to create tax 
benefits to attract new firms for less developed regions, help fight population migration 
out of inland areas and promote economic and social recovering of those regions. The 
main goal was to boost the regional economy of those regions.  
The corporate tax rate suffered several modifications (see Figure 1). According to No. 2 
of the article 7 of the Law nr. 171/99, the corporate tax rate for new firms located in 
eligible counties was 20% and it lasted for the first five years of activity. In non-eligible 
counties, new firms faced a corporate tax rate of 32%. According to Ofício-Circulado 
147, the beneficiary areas were chosen according to population density, tax deficiency 
and inequalities of social, economic and cultural opportunities. Table B1 of Appendix B 
presents the complete list of eligible counties.   
The fiscal incentives were then updated and integrated in Estatuto dos Benefícios 
Fiscais through a new article 39.º - B. The article 83º of the Law nr. 53-A/2006, 
changed the corporate tax rate to 15% for new firms located in the same eligible 
counties, while the corporate tax rate for non-eligible counties was 25%. This law was 
revoked by the article 73º of the Law nr. 67-A/2007, which changed again the corporate 
                                                          
1 By Luís Marques Mendes, Manuela Ferreira Leite, Fernando Santos Pereira, Artur Torres Pereira, José 
Cesário, Álvaro Amaro, Manuel Moreira and Carlos Coelho. 
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tax rate from 15% to 10% benefiting the new firms, while the normal tax in the country 






















4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Data 
Data on firm entry come from a matched employer-employee database (QP - “Quadros 
de Pessoal”). 
QP is a mandatory survey submitted annually to the Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security (MESS) by firms with at minimum one employee. 
This database gathers detailed information on more than 220,000 firms and 2 million 
individuals per year, which covers almost the entire Portuguese private sector from 
1986 to 2012. Annually, for each firm, the following data is available: entry year, 
location, size, industry, number of establishments, initial capital and ownership 
structure. 
Data on regional demographic characteristics, namely child birth rate and the divorce 
rate came from INE.  
 
4.2. Sample 
From QP, we select all new firms established between 1997 and 2007. We exclude non-
profit firms and start-ups in the primary sector. Next, we compute the total number of 
firms by county and year. In total, we ended up with 35,508 county year observations, 
corresponding to 21,912 eligible counties and 13,596 non-eligible counties.  
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for our sample divided into eligible and non-
eligible counties. We consider three periods: (1) the period before the introduction of 
14 
 
the policy, (2) the period when the policy is introduced with a corporate tax rate of 20%, 
and (3) the period when the corporate tax rate suffers another reduction to 15%.  
The eligible counties are associated with an increase in the number of new firms. The 
average number of new firms per county is 0.85 between the period 1997 and 1999, 
1.33 in the period between 2000 and 2004, and 1.41 between 2005 and 2007. Regarding 
population,  population density and purchasing power, we notice that with the 
introduction of the policy, the population and population density decreased, while the 
purchasing power increased. The average population remained around the 14,000, 
population density was, on average, approximately 54 and, in the period after the policy, 
decreased to approximately 53, and purchasing power was, on average, 53.81 before the 
introduction of the policy and increased to 58.57 between the period 2000 and 2004, 
and to 64.26 between 2005 and 2007. Concerning the socio-demographic 
characteristics, we notice that after the introduction of the policy, the child birth rate 
decreased (before the introduction of the policy it was approximately 9 and after 
decreased to 8 between 2000 and 2004, and to 7 between 2005 and 2007), while the 
divorce rate increased (remaining, on average, around 1). To sum up, the eligible 
counties present an increase in the number of new firms, in the purchasing power and in 
the divorce rate. In contrast, population in these regions does not increase, and the child 
birth rate decreases. 
The non-eligible counties are also associated with an increase in the number of new 
firms. The average number of new firms per county is 5.07 between the period 1997 and 
1999, 7.70 in the period between 2000 and 2004, and 8.80 between 2005 and 2007. In 
these regions we see that population, population density and purchasing power have 
increased in the period after the introduction of the policy. Regarding the socio-
demographic characteristics, we notice that in the period after the introduction of the 
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policy, the child birth rate decreased (before the introduction of the policy it was 10.91 
and after decreased to 10.74 between 2000 and 2004, and to 9.94 between 2005 and 
2007), while the divorce rate increased (was, on average, 1 and after the policy 
increased to 2). Thus, the non-eligible counties present an increase in the number of new 
firms, population, population density, purchasing power and in the divorce rate, while 




















5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the policy of tax benefits for inland regions on 
firm entry and on the regional socio-demographic characteristics. For this, we use a 
difference-in-differences approach. The idea is to compare outcomes in counties in 
which the tax benefits policy is introduced to counterfactuals which are formed by 
observed outcomes in non-eligible counties prior and after the policy.  
  
5.1. Firm Entry 
To evaluate if the policy increases firm entry, we start by analyzing the full sample of 
269 counties at different stages of the policy. Next, we reduce our sample to 
neighboring counties (75 counties) and to counties which distant themselves less than 
20 Km (41 counties) (see Figure 2 and 3). From the analysis we exclude the years 2000 
and 2005 because they coincide with the years of the introduction of the policy. 
Let 𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑦 be the number of newly formed firms, measured as logarithm, in county i at 
month m and year y. We assess the impact of tax benefits using the following equation: 
  
 𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑦 = 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜔𝑦 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑦 + 𝑖𝑚𝑦 
 
where i denotes county, y is entry year and m is entry month. 
Our variable of interest is 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦. It is a dummy variable equaling one for the eligible 
counties after the tax benefit policy is implemented, and zero otherwise. 
We also include a vector of counties characteristics, 𝑋′𝑖𝑦 to control for regional 
characteristics. We add county’s population and population density, measured on 
logarithms, purchasing power and one-stop shop dummy, which equals one if the 




purchasing power controls for richer counties, population and population density 
because entrepreneurs create more firms where there is more population. One-stop shop 
controls for other policies which affect the creation of new firms.  
Our specification includes county, year and month dummies to control for region, year 
and monthly fixed effects. 𝛿𝑚 are month dummy variables, 𝜔𝑦 are year dummies 
covering the period from 1997 until 2007 and 𝜌𝑖 are county dummies. The standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. 
Table 2 presents the results for the specification (1) using all 269 counties and Table 3 
presents the results for the specification (1) using the restricted sample.  
The introduction of the policy reduced the number of new firms in 4.3% (Column 1 of 
Table 2). When we restrict the sample to neighbor counties and counties which distant 
less than 20 Km, we find that this number reduced to 3% and 2.5%, respectively, but 
these coefficients lose statistical significance (Column 1 and 2 of Table 3). This 
negative relationship between the dependent variable and our variable of interest leads 
us to reject our Hypothesis 1 that suggest that the policy of tax benefits to inland areas 
increases firm entry.  
In terms of controls, we find that population density and one-stop shop influence the 
entry of new firms. The counties with more population density create more 49.8% firms 
and the one-stop shop increased firm entry by 5.1% (Column 1 of Table 2). When we 
restrict our sample to neighbor counties these values change to 24.1% and 15.4%, 
respectively (Column 1 of Table 3). In the counties that distant less than 20 Km, only 
the one-stop shop have a positive impact (Column 2 of Table 3).    
Since the policy vary along the years, we divided our data into three periods: 1997 and 
1999, where the policy was not implemented; 2000 and 2004, where the policy was 
implemented and corporate tax was 20% and the period between 2005 and 2007, where 
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the corporate tax rate further decreased to 15%. During the same period, the corporate 
tax rate faced by new firms in non-eligible counties was 32% for 2000 and 2001, 30% 
for 2002 and 2003, and 25% between 2004 and 2007. 
Our baseline specification changes to: 
 
𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑦 = 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜔𝑦 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑦 + 𝑖𝑚𝑦 
 
In this case, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 is a dummy variable equaling one for the eligible counties and 
years when the corporate tax rate applied to new firms was of 20% and zero otherwise. 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 is a dummy variable equaling one for the eligible counties and years when 
the corporate tax rate reduced to 15% and zero otherwise. 
The results for the specification (2) are presented in Column (2) of  Table 2. Once again, 
the results show a negative relationship between the dependent variable and our 
variables of interest. The coefficient associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 is negative and not 
statistically significant, while the one associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 is -0.065 which suggest 
that the second time that tax benefits were introduced, the number of new firms reduced 
by 6.5%. Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 1 which stated that the policy of 
tax benefits to inland areas increases firm entry.   
Once again, we find that the population density and the one-stop shop influence the 
entry of new firms. The counties with higher population density create more 58.4% 
firms and the one-stop shop increased firm entry by 5.3%. 
The error term in the previous model could be endogenous, because it is correlated with 
our explanatory variable, Policy, and this creates a bias problem. We will then apply an 
instrumental variable estimation. We assume that the policy was implemented to favor 




reason, we introduce an instrumental variable, 𝑍𝑖𝑦, which is equal to one for the 
counties whose mayor is from PSD, and zero otherwise. 
Column (3) of Table 2 and Column (3) and (4) of Table 3 present the results for 
specification (1) using our instrumental variable.  
We find that the introduction of the policy reduces the number of new firms by 6.9%. 
When we restrict the sample to counties which distant less than 20 Km this number 
changes to -35.1%. On the other hand, we notice that for neighbor counties, with the 
introduction of the policy, the number of new firms increased 66.3%.  
 
5.2. Regional  Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
In the following sections we test the impact of the policy on two regional demographic 
characteristics: child birth rate and divorce rate, using the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑦 = 𝜔𝑦 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑦 + 𝑖𝑦 
 
where i denotes the county and y is the year. 
First, we evaluate child birth rate measured as number of live births occurred during a 
year over the average population of that period. This measure is expressed in number of 
live births per 1000 inhabitants. 
 As mentioned before, our variable of interest is 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦, a dummy variable equaling 
one if the policy is implemented in county i and year y, and zero otherwise. 𝑋′𝑖𝑦 
includes regional control variables (population and population density, measured as 
logarithm, and purchasing power). 
As noted on Hypothesis 2 we expect the number of child births to increase on the 




Table 4 presents the results for the specification (3) using all 269 counties and Table 5 
presents the results for the specification (3) using the restricted sample.  
The coefficient associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦 is negative and it is not statistically significant. 
But, when we restrict the sample to neighbor counties and counties which distant less 
than 20 Km, we find that the introduction of the policy increased the child birth rate in 
0.154 and 0.323, respectively. This leads us to accept our Hypothesis 2 that suggested 
that the policy of tax benefits to inland regions would lead to an increase on child birth 
rates.  
In terms of controls, we find that both population and purchasing power have a positive 
influence on the child birth rate, while the population density exercise a negative effect. 
In the counties with more population we see an increase of the child birth rate of 6.077 
and the ones with more purchasing power increase it by 0.016. When we restrict our 
sample to the counties which distant less than 20 Km, these values change to 5.055 and 
0.025, respectively. In the neighbor counties, we also see that the ones with more 
purchasing power increase the child birth rate by 0.024 and the ones with more 
population density increase it 0.190. 
Column (2) of Table 4 presents the results for specification (2) considering three time 
periods and by substituting the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦 with two variables: 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 and 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 as in specification (2). The coefficient associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 is -0.098, 
which suggest that the first time that tax benefits were introduced, the child birth rate 
decreased by 0.098, while the coefficient associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 is 0.104, which 
suggest that the second time that tax benefits were introduced, the child birth rate 
increased by 0.104. Thus, we find partial support for Hypothesis 2, which stated that the 
policy of tax benefits to inland regions would lead to more child births. 
21 
 
In this equation, we find once again that, in terms of controls, both population and 
purchasing power have a positive influence on the child birth rate, while the population 
density has a negative effect. The counties with more population increased by 6.739 the 
child birth rate and the ones with more purchasing power increased it by 0.015. 
Column (3) of Table 4 and Column (3) and (4) of Table 5 presents the results for 
specification (3) using our instrumental variable. 
The introduction of the policy negatively impact the child birth rate, but with the 
introduction of our instrumental variable this coefficient turns statistically significant to 
0.310. When we restrict our sample to counties that distant less than 20 Km this 
coefficient changes to -0.412, while for neighbor counties this value remains positive 
but it is not statistically significant. This leads us to reject our Hypothesis 2. 
Next, we evaluate the impact of the policy on the divorce rate, measured as the number 
of divorces observed during a year, over to the average population of that period. This 
measure is expressed by the number of divorces per 1000 inhabitants. As in the previous 
specifications, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦 is the main variable for this analysis. The vector 𝑋′𝑖𝑦 represents 
the counties characteristics, namely population and population density, measured as 
logarithm, and purchasing power.  
As noted on Hypothesis 3 we expect the number of divorces to increase in the regions 
that had access to tax benefits.  
The results are presented in Table 6, using all 269 counties and in Table 7, using the 
restricted sample.  
The introduction of the policy reduced the divorce rate by 2.4%. When we restrict the 
sample to neighbor counties and counties which distant less than 20 Km, we find that 
this rate reduces to 8.5% and 7%. This negative relationship between the dependent 
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variable and our variable of interest leads us to reject our Hypothesis 3 that suggest that 
the policy of tax benefits to inland areas increases the divorce rate. 
In terms of controls, we find that population, population density and purchasing power 
have a positive influence on the divorce rate. The counties with more population 
increase the divorce rate by 1.033, the ones with more population density increase the 
rate by 0.661 and the counties with more purchasing power increase by 0.007 the 
divorce rate. When we restrict our sample to the counties that distant less than 20 Km 
we see that, regarding population density and purchasing power, these values increase to 
0.883 and 0.009, respectively. In the neighbor counties, only the purchasing power have 
a positive impact of 0.004. 
Again, Column (2) of Table 6 presents the results for specification (2) considering three 
time periods and by substituting the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑦 with two variables: 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 
and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 as in specification (2). The coefficient associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦1𝑖𝑦 is -
0.081, which suggest that the first time that tax benefits were introduced, the divorce 
rate reduced by 8.1%, while the coefficient associated with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦2𝑖𝑦 is 0.099, which 
suggest that the second time that tax benefits were introduced, the divorce rate increased 
by 9.9%. Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3 (which stated that the policy of 
tax benefits to inland areas increases the divorce rate) in the first stage of the policy but 
in the second stage we accept it. 
In this equation, we find once again that, in terms of controls, population, population 
density and purchasing power have a positive influence on the divorce rate. The 
counties with more population increase the divorce rate by 1.634, the ones with more 
population density increase this rate by 0.350 and the ones with more purchasing power 
increase it by 0.007.  
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Again, Column (3) of Table 5 and Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 present the results for 
specification (3) using our instrumental variable. 
Once again we find that the introduction of the policy have a negative impact on the 
divorce rate, in this case, of 0.372. When we restrict our sample to counties that distant 
less than 20 Km this value changes to -0.513, while for neighbor counties this value 
becomes positive but it is not statistically significant. This leads us to the same 
conclusion as before, rejecting our Hypothesis 3. 
In terms of controls, we find again that counties with more population and purchasing 
power have more divorces, but in the ones with higher population density the divorce 
rate decreases. When we restrict our sample to neighbor counties we see that, as before, 
the counties with more purchasing power have more divorces, and we notice in this case 
that also the counties with higher population density have more divorces. In the counties 
which distant less than 20 Km, we notice that as before the population density and 
purchasing power continue to have a positive impact on the divorce rate, but the values 










6. Conclusion  
The aim of our study was to analyze the effect of a policy of tax benefits to inland areas 
in Portugal between the period of 1997 until 2007. Specifically, we analyzed the effect 
of this policy on firm entry and on child birth rate and divorce rate. 
Through the literature review, it was found that the majority of the studies argue that the 
tax reductions contribute to the entry of new firms. To contribute for this discussion, we 
analyzed the Portuguese case by comparing a set of inland eligible regions with non-
eligible regions.  
We found that the policy does not have a positive effect on the entry of new firms, nor 
on the child birth and divorce rate. This is not consistent with our hypotheses. The 
negative effect on firm entry persists even when we divide our sample into the different 
stages of the policy introduction. These results are not consistent in restricted samples 
(nearby counties). As the policy was implemented in regions economically less 
developed, our results suggest that the tax benefits were not enough to promote 
entrepreneurial activity nor the development of a region. Also, these results can be 
explained by the inconsistency of fiscal policies.    
Giving this results, governments should find ways to attract new entrepreneurs, 
domestic and foreign, to invest in the less developed regions. To do so, it is necessary a 
long-term plan which involves an investment on infrastructures capable of offering 
good conditions to entrepreneurs to develop their investments and conditions of fixing 
the population in these territories.      
This study could be further developed by analyzing other county variables, like the 
number of schools or hospitals, the crime rate and using an economic variable like the 
GDP, with a more enlarged dataset. Regional level data on socio-demographic 
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characteristics was unavailable. It would also be useful to study similar fiscal policies 
that encourage entrepreneurship. 
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Figure 1 – Corporate Tax Rate Applied to New Firms (1997-2007; %) 
 



























Source: Oficio-Circulado 147, 30/03/2001 – Direcção de Serviços do IRC 
Notes: In red are the counties which were not included in our analysis, in green are the 



















Source: Oficio-Circulado 147, 30/03/2001 – Direcção de Serviços do IRC and 
http://www.adistanciaentre.com/ 
Notes: In red are the counties which were not included in our analysis, in blue are the 
counties which distant less than 20 Km from the eligible counties, represented in 




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A – Eligible Firms 
 
Panel B – Non-Eligible Firms  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for firms established between 1997 and 2007, 
and respective firms’ and counties’ characteristics for eligible and non-eligible counties. 











Between 1997 and 1999 Between 2000 and 2004 Between 2005 and 2007
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Number of new firms 5976 .8534137 1.964607 9960 1.334137 3.846095 5976 1.406627 4.158248
Population 5976 14192.99 13227.75 9960 14141.79 13631.82 5976 14084.15 13922.77
Population density 5976 53.57193 48.39772 9960 52.75853 50.25605 5976 52.55518 50.71003
Purchasing Power 5976 53.81201 14.68121 9960 58.56931 14.19542 5976 64.26418 14.91044
Birth rate 5976 8.569277 2.206856 9960 8.173133 2.161526 5976 7.334337 1.900287
Divorce rate 5976 .8355422 .4943887 9960 1.31012 .6609334 5976 1.486546 .6879912
After
Before
Between 1997 and 1999 Between 2000 and 2004 Between 2005 and 2007
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Number of new firms 3708 5.066073 10.58898 6180 7.698382 18.25849 3708 8.800971 23.85019
Population 3708 66866.86 81195.85 6180 69010.41 80795.92 3708 70833 80801.53
Population density 3708 649.2549 1345.6 6180 667.1497 1268.832 3708 671.6234 1248.95
Purchasing Power 3708 82.99133 36.49837 6180 86.19225 31.98699 3708 91.1121 27.30462
Birth rate 3708 10.91197 2.238992 6180 10.73825 1.976975 3708 9.941424 1.967694

















Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients for equation (1) and (2). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of newly formed firms. Region, month and year fixed effects 
are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in 













VARIABLES Total Sample Different Stages IV Total Sample
policy -0.043** -0.069*
(0.021) (0.038)
lnpop 0.251 0.148 0.258
(0.186) (0.205) (0.186)
lnden 0.498*** 0.584*** 0.427***
(0.152) (0.160) (0.115)
pp -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)






Observations 16,904 15,178 16,904
R-squared 0.784 0.782 0.784
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Table 3: Impact of the Policy of Tax Benefits for Inland Areas on Firm Entry – 
Restricted Sample 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients for equation (1). The dependent variable 
is the logarithm of newly formed firms. Region, month and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in 















(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Neighbor Counties Counties Distant <20Km IV Neighbor Counties IV Counties Distant <20Km
policy -0.030 -0.025 0.663*** -0.351**
(0.032) (0.046) (0.178) (0.165)
lnpop 0.398*** 0.815 0.464*** 1.061**
(0.117) (0.506) (0.122) (0.536)
lnden 0.241** 0.494 0.386*** -0.287
(0.096) (0.444) (0.111) (0.432)
pp -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
onestop 0.154*** 0.220*** 0.204*** 0.208***
(0.048) (0.059) (0.052) (0.060)
Observations 5,295 2,833 5,295 2,833
R-squared 0.772 0.772 0.751 0.768
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Table 4: Impact of the Policy of Tax Benefits for Inland Areas on Regional Socio-











Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients for equation (3) and (4). The dependent 
variable is the child birth rate. Region and year fixed effects are included but not 
reported. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 















VARIABLES Total Sample Different Stages IV Total Sample
policy -0.028 -0.310***
(0.035) (0.054)
lnpop 6.077*** 6.739*** 6.143***
(0.279) (0.325) (0.278)
lnden -1.868*** -2.152*** -2.645***
(0.209) (0.222) (0.136)






Observations 32,280 29,052 32,280
R-squared 0.830 0.835 0.829
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Table 5: Impact of the Policy of Tax Benefits for Inland Areas on Regional Socio-
Economic Activity (Child Birth Rate) – Restricted Sample 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients for equation (3). The dependent variable 
is the child birth rate. Region and year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Neighbor Counties Counties Distant <20Km IV Neighbor Counties IV Counties Distant <20Km
policy 0.154*** 0.323*** 0.230 -0.412**
(0.049) (0.074) (0.242) (0.209)
lnpop -0.158 5.055*** -0.166 5.218***
(0.141) (0.672) (0.140) (0.696)
lnden 0.190* -2.182*** 0.220 -3.635***
(0.114) (0.575) (0.134) (0.553)
pp 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 9,000 4,920 9,000 4,920
R-squared 0.826 0.846 0.826 0.842
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Table 6: Impact of the Policy of Tax Benefits for Inland Areas on Regional Socio-











Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients for equation (3) and (4). The dependent 
variable is the divorce rate. Region and year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 














VARIABLES Total Sample Different Stages IV Total Sample
policy -0.024* -0.372***
(0.012) (0.021)
lnpop 1.033*** 1.634*** 1.115***
(0.119) (0.137) (0.117)
lnden 0.661*** 0.350*** -0.301***
(0.094) (0.100) (0.053)






Observations 32,280 29,052 32,280
R-squared 0.739 0.742 0.733
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Table 7: Impact of the Policy of Tax Benefits for Inland Areas on Regional Socio-
Economic Activity (Divorce Rate) – Restricted Sample 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients for equation (3). The dependent variable 
is the divorce rate. Region and year fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard 














(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Neighbor Counties Counties Distant <20Km IV Neighbor Counties IV Counties Distant <20Km
policy -0.085*** -0.070*** 0.112 -0.513***
(0.017) (0.027) (0.119) (0.083)
lnpop -0.035 0.031 -0.054 0.129
(0.059) (0.268) (0.056) (0.288)
lnden 0.034 0.883*** 0.112* 0.007
(0.053) (0.230) (0.058) (0.231)
pp 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 9,000 4,920 9,000 4,920
R-squared 0.718 0.720 0.714 0.703
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Appendix A – Laws and Legal Documents on the Tax benefits to Inland Regions 
(1997-2007) 
 
Law nr. 127-B/97, of 20/9 (Lei n.º 127-B/97, de 20de Dezembro de 1997 – I Série A), 
Legislative authorization for the government (PS) create a system of fiscal incentives 
for the micro and samll firms. 
 
Projeto de Lei 522/VII, Legislative initiative of PSD over the legislative authorization 
above. 
 
Law nr. 171/99, of 18/9 (Lei n.º 171/99, de 18 de Setembro de 1999), Combating 
desertification and recovery of development in inland areas. 
 
Ofício-Circulado 147, 30 de Março de 2001, Definition of eligible counties and 
eligibility criteria. 
 
Portaria 2086/2001, 13 de Dezembro de 2001 – II Série, Definition of eligible counties 
and eligibility criteria (equal to OF 147/2001). 
 
Portaria 1467-A/2001, 31 de Dezembro de 2001 – I Série B, Definition of eligible 
counties and eligibility criteria (equal to OF 147/2001 and Portaria 2086/2001). 
 
Law nr. 53-A/2006 (Lei n.º 53-A/2006, de 29 de Dezembro de 2006 – Série I nº249), 




Law nr. 67-A/2007 (Lei n.º 67-A/2007, de 31 de Dezembro de 2007), Definition of the 

























Appendix B – Eligible Counties Associated with the Tax Benefits to Inland Regions 
Table B1: Eligible Counties 
NUTS III Counties 








Macedo de Cavaleiros 
 












Vila Pouca de Aguiar 
 
Vimioso 
  Vinhais 
Ave Póvoa de Lanhoso 
  Vieira do Minho 
Cávado Amares 
 
Terras de Bouro 





Carrazeda de Ansiães 
 














Santa Marta de Penaguião 
 












Vila Nova de Foz Côa 
  Vila Real 
Entre Douro e Vouga Arouca 










Paredes de Coura 
 
Ponte da Barca 
 




Viana do Castelo 
  Vila Nova de Cerveira 
Tâmega Baião 
 
Cabeceiras de Basto 
 
Castelo de Paiva 
 




Mondim de Basto 
 
Resende 
  Ribeira de Pena 
Baixo Mondego Penacova 
Beira Interior Norte Almeida 
 
Celorico da Beira 
 











  Trancoso 





  Vila Velha de Rodão 
Cova da Beira Belmonte 
 
Covilhã 
  Fundão 
Dão-Lafões Aguiar da Beira 
 










Oliveira de Frades 
 












Vila Nova de Paiva 
 
Viseu 
  Vouzela 






Castanheira de Pêra 
 






Miranda do Corvo 
 







  Vila Nova de Poiares 







  Vila de Rei 
Serra da Estrela Fornos de Algodres 
 
Gouveia 
  Seia 
Médio Tejo Ferreira do Zêzere 
  Sardoal 
Lezíria do Tejo Chamusca 
























Viana do Alentejo 
  Vila Viçosa 








Santiago do Cacém 
  Sines 


























Ponte de Sor 
  Portalegre 






























São Brás de Alportel 
 
Vila do Bispo 
  Vila Real de Santo António 
 
Source: Oficio-Circulado 147, 30/03/2001 – Direcção de Serviços do IRC 
 
 
 
